## Detecting Anomalies



## Tracing Infections

- For every infection, we must find the earlier infection that causes it.
- Which origin should we focus upon?



## Tracing Infections



|  |
| :---: |



## Focusing on Anomalies

- Examine origins and locations where something abnormal happens



## What's normal?

- General idea: Use induction - reasoning from the particular to the general
- Start with a multitude of runs
- Determine properties that are common across all runs


## What's abnormal?

- Suppose we determine common properties of all passing runs.
- Now we examine a run which fails the test.
- Any difference in properties correlates with failure - and is likely to hint at failure causes


## Detecting Anomalies



Differences correlate with failure

## Properties

Data properties that hold in all runs:

- "At f(), x is odd"
-" $0 \leq x \leq 10$ during the run"
Code properties that hold in all runs:
- " $f($ () is always executed"
- "After open(), we eventually have close()"


## Comparing Coverage

I. Every failure is caused by an infection, which in turn is caused by a defect
2. The defect must be executed to start the infection
3. Code that is executed in failing runs only is thus likely to cause the defect

## The middle program

\$ middle 335<br>middle: 3<br>\$ middle 213<br>middle: 1

```
int main(int arc, char *argv[])
{
    int x = atoi(argv[1]);
    int y = atoi(argv[2]);
    int z = atoi(argv[3]);
    int m = middle(x, y, z);
    printf("middle: %d\n", m);
    return 0;
}
```

```
int middle(int x, int y, int z) {
        int m = z;
        if (y < z) {
        if (x < y)
            m = y;
        else if (x < z)
            m = y;
    } else {
        if (x > y)
            m = y;
        else if (x > z)
            m = x;
        }
        return m;
}
```


## Obtaining Coverage <br> for C programs

| (9) Pippin: cgi_encode - less - 80×24 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 4: | 18: | int ok $=0$; |
| -: | 19: |  |
| 38: | 20: | while (*eptr) /* loop to end of string ('\0' character) */ |
| -: | 21: | \{ |
| -: | $22:$ | char c; |
| 30: | 23: | $\mathrm{c}=$ *eptr; |
| 30: | 24: | if ( $\mathrm{C}==$ '+') \{ /* '+' maps to blank */ |
| 1: | 25: | *dptr $=$ ' '; |
| 29: | 26: | \} else if ( $\mathrm{c}=$ = '\%') \{ /* '\%xx' is hex for char xx */ |
| 3: | 27: | int digit_high $=$ Hex_Values [*(++eptr)]; |
| 3: | 28: | int digit_low = Hex_Values[*(++eptr)]; |
| 5: | 29: | if (digit_high ==-1 \|| digit_low ==-1) |
| 2 : | 30: | ok $=1$; /* Bad return code */ |
| -: | 31: | else ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |
| 1 : | $32:$ | *dptr $=16$ * digit_high + digit_low; |
| -: | 33: | \} else \{ /* All other characters map to themselves */ |
| 26: | 34: | *dptr $=$ *eptr; |
| -: | 35: |  |
| $30:$ | 36: | ++dptr; ++eptr; |
| -: | 37: |  |
| 4: | 38: | *dptr $=$ ' $\ 0$ '; /* Null terminator for string */ |
| 4: | 39: | return ok; |
| -: | 40:\} |  |
| (END) |  |  |



## Discrete Coloring

$\square$ executed only in failing runs highly suspect
executed in passing and failing runs ambiguous
executed only in passing runs
likely correct

| x | 3 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| y | 3 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| z | 5 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| int middle(int $x$, int y , int z ) \{ | - | - | - | - | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |
| int $m=z$; | $\bullet$ | - | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |
| if (y<z) \{ | - | - | - | - | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |
| if $(x<y)$ |  | $\bullet$ |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{m}=\mathrm{y}$; |  | $\bullet$ |  |  |  |  |
| else if ( $x<z$ ) | $\bullet$ |  |  |  | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |
| $m=y ;$ | - |  |  |  |  | $\bullet$ |
| \} else \{ | $\bullet$ |  | - | - |  |  |
| if $(x>y)$ |  |  | - |  |  |  |
| $m=y ;$ |  |  | - |  |  |  |
| else if ( $x>z$ ) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{m}=\mathrm{x}$; |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \} |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| return m; | - | - | - | - | - | $\bullet$ |
| \} | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | 3 |



## Continuous Coloring

$\square$ executed only in failing runs

$\square$
passing and failing runs
$\square$ executed only in passing runs

## Hue

hue $(s)=$ red hue $+\frac{\% \operatorname{passed}(s)}{\% \operatorname{passed}(s)+\% \operatorname{failed}(s)} \times$ hue range

0\% passed $\square$ 100\% passed

## Brightness

frequently executed
$\operatorname{bright}(s)=\max (\%$ passed $(s), \%$ failed $(s))$
rarely executed



## Evaluation

How well does comparing coverage detect anomalies?

- How green are the defects? (false negatives)
- How red are non-defects? (false positives)


## Space

- 8000 lines of executable code
- I000 test suites with I56-4700 test cases
- 20 defective versions with one defect each (corrected in subsequent version)



Source: Jones et al., ICSE 2002

## Siemens Suite

- 7 C programs, I70-560 lines
- I 32 variations with one defect each
- I08 all yellow (i.e., useless)
- I with one red statement (at the defect)


## Nearest Neighbor



## Nearest Neighbor



Compare with the single run that has the most similar coverage

## Locating Defects



## Sequences

Sequences of locations can correlate with failures:

| open() read() close() | $\checkmark$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| open() close() read() | $X$ |
| close() open() read() | $X$ |

...but all locations are executed in both runs!

## The AspectJ Compiler

```
$ ajc Test3.aj
$ java test.Test3
test.Test3@b8df17.x Unexpected Signal : 11
occurred at PC=0xFA415A00
Function name=(N/A) Library=(N/A)
Please report this error at http://
java.sun.com/ .. .
$
```


## Coverage Differences

- Compare the failing run with passing runs
- BcelShadow.getThisJoinPointVar() is invoked in the failing run only
- Unfortunately, this method is correct


## Sequence Differences

This sequence occurs only in the failing run:

ThisJoinPointVisitor.isRef(),
ThisJoinPointVisitor.canTreatAsStatic(), MethodDeclaration.traverse(), ThisJoinPointVisitor.isRef(),
ThisJoinPointVisitor.isRef()

## Collecting Sequences



## Ingoing vs. Outgoing



## Anomalies



## NanoXML

- Simple XML parser written in Java
- 5 revisions, each with 16-23 classes
- 33 errors discovered or seeded


## Locating Defects

- AMPLE/window size 8

Dallmeier et al. (ECOOP 2005)



## Properties

Data properties that hold in all runs:

- "At $f(), x$ is odd"
- " $0 \leq x \leq 10$ during the run"

> that hold in all runs:

- " f() is always executed"
- "After open(), we eventually have close()"


## Techniques

| Dynamic | Value <br> Ranges | Sampled <br> Values |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

## Techniques



## Dynamic Invariants



## Daikon

- Determines invariants from program runs
- Written by Michael Ernst et al. (I998-)
- C++, Java, Lisp, and other languages
- analyzed up to 13,000 lines of code


## Daikon

```
public int ex1511(int[] b, int n)
{
    int s = 0;
    int i = 0;
    while (i != n) {
        s = s + b[i];
        i = i + 1;
        }
        return s;
```

```
Precondition
```

Precondition
n == size(b[])
n == size(b[])
b != null
b != null
n <= 13
n <= 13
n >= 7

```
n >= 7
```

```
Postcondition
```

Postcondition
b[] = orig(b[])
b[] = orig(b[])
return == sum(b)
return == sum(b)
}

- Run with 100 randomly generated arrays of length 7-I3

```

\section*{Daikon}


\section*{Getting the Trace}

- Records all variable values at all function entries and exits
- Uses VALGRIND to create the trace

\section*{Filtering Invariants}
- Daikon has a library of invariant patterns over variables and constants
- Only matching patterns are preserved


\section*{Method Specifications}
using primitive data
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline\(x=6\) & \(x \in\{2,5,-30\}\) & \(x<y\) \\
\hline\(y=5 x+10\) & \(z=4 x+12 y+3\) & \(z=f n(x, y)\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
using composite data
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline A subseq \(B\) & \(x \in A\) & \(\operatorname{sorted}(A)\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
checked at method entry + exit

\section*{Object Invariants}
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline string.content[string.length] \(=90 '\) \\
\hline node.left.value \(\leq\) node.right.value \\
\hline this.next.last \(=\) this \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
checked at entry + exit of public methods

\section*{Matching Invariants}
```

public int ex1511(int[] b, int n)
{
int s = 0;
int i = 0;
while (i != n) {
s=s + b[i];
i = i + 1;
}
return s;
}

```
\(A==B\)
Pattern


Variables

\section*{Matching Invariants}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline\(==\) & \(s\) & \(n\) & \begin{tabular}{c} 
size \\
\((\mathrm{b}[])\)
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} 
sum \\
\((\mathrm{b}[])\)
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} 
orig \\
\((\mathrm{n})\)
\end{tabular} & ret \\
\hline s & & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) & & & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) & \\
\hline n & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) & & & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) & & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) \\
\hline size(b[]) & & & & & & \\
\hline sum(b[]) & & \(\mathbf{X}\) & & & & \\
\hline orig(n) & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) & & & & & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) \\
\hline ret & & \(X\) & & & \(\boldsymbol{X}\) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\footnotetext{
run I
}
\(A==B\)
Pattern
s size \((\mathrm{b}[])\) sum (b[])
orig(n)
return .
Variables

\section*{Matching Invariants}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline = & s & n & \[
\begin{array}{|l|l}
\hline \text { size } \\
\text { (bl] }
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { sum } \\
& \text { (b[]) }
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
orig \\
(n)
\end{tabular} & ret \\
\hline s & & \(x\) & \(X\) & & \(X\) & \\
\hline n & \(x\) & & & \(x\) & \(x\) & \(x\) \\
\hline size(b]) & \(x\) & & & X & & \(x\) \\
\hline sum(b]) & & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & \\
\hline orig(n) & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & & \(x\) \\
\hline ret & & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\[
A==B
\]

Pattern
s size \((\mathrm{b}[])\) sum(b[])
orig(n)
return ..
Variables

\section*{Matching Invariants}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline = & s & n & size (b]) & sum (b]) & \begin{tabular}{l}
orig \\
( n )
\end{tabular} & ret \\
\hline s & & X & \(x\) & & \(X\) & \\
\hline n & \(x\) & & & \(x\) & X & \(X\) \\
\hline size(b[]) & \(x\) & & & X & & \(x\) \\
\hline sum(b]) & & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & \\
\hline orig(n) & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & & \(x\) \\
\hline ret & & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\[
A==B
\]

Pattern


\section*{Matching Invariants}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline = & s & n & \[
\begin{array}{|l|l}
\hline \text { size } \\
\text { (b]) }
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{array}{l|}
\hline \text { sum } \\
(\mathrm{b}[\mathrm{I}
\end{array}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
orig \\
(n)
\end{tabular} & ret & \(\mathrm{s}==\operatorname{sum}(\mathrm{b}[])\) \\
\hline s & & X & \(X\) & & \(X\) & , & \\
\hline n & \(x\) & & - & \(x\) & X & \(x\) & \(s==r e t\) \\
\hline size(b]) & \(x\) & & & \(X\) & & \(x\) & \\
\hline sum(b]) & & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & & \(\mathrm{n}==\operatorname{size}(\mathrm{b}[])\) \\
\hline orig(n) & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & & \(x\) & \\
\hline ret & & \(x\) & \(x\) & & \(x\) & & \(\mathrm{ret}==\operatorname{sum}(\mathrm{b}[])\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{Matching Invariants}
```

public int ex1511(int[] b, int n)
{
int s = 0;
int i = 0;
while (i != n) {

$$
\mathrm{s}==\text { ret }
$$

```
```

s == sum(b[])

```
s == sum(b[])
    s == ret
\[
\mathrm{s}=\mathrm{s}+\mathrm{b}[\mathrm{i}]
\]
\[
\mathrm{i}=\mathrm{i}+1
\]
\[
\mathrm{n}==\operatorname{size}(\mathrm{b}[])
\]
\[
\}
\]
return s;
\[
\text { ret }==\operatorname{sum}(b[])
\]
```


## Enhancing Relevance

- Handle polymorphic variables
- Check for derived values
- Eliminate redundant invariants
- Set statistical threshold for relevance
- Verify correctness with static analysis
polymorphic variables: treat "object x" like "int x" if possible derived values: have "size (...)" as extra value to compare against redundant invariants: like $x$ $>0=>x>=0$
statistical threshold: to eliminate random occurrences verify correctness: to make sure invariants always hold


## Daikon Discussed

- As long as some property can be observed, it can be added as a pattern
- Pattern vocabulary determines the invariants that can be found ("sum()", etc.)
- Checking all patterns (and combinations!) is expensive
- Trivial invariants must be eliminated


## Techniques

| Dynamic <br> Invariants | Value <br> Ranges | Sampled <br> Values |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

## Dynamic Invariants



## Diduce

- Determines invariants and violations
- Written by Sudheendra Hangal and Monica Lam (200I)
- Java bytecode
- analyzed > 30,000 lines of code


## Diduce



## Training Mode



- Start with empty set of invariants
- Adjust invariants according to values found during run


## Invariants in Diduce

For each variable, Diduce has a pair (V, M)

- $\mathrm{V}=$ initial value of variable
- $M=$ range of values: $i$-th bit of $M$ is cleared if value change in i-th bit was observed
- With each assignment of a new value $W$, $M$ is updated to $M:=M \wedge \neg(W \otimes V)$
- Differences are stored in same format


## Training Example

| Code | i | Values |  | Differences |  | Invariant |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | v | M | v | M |  |
| $\mathrm{i}=10$ | 1010 | 1010 | IIII | - | - | $\mathrm{i}=10$ |
| i += 1 | 1011 | 1010 | 1110 | I | 1111 | $10 \leq i \leq 11 \wedge\left\|i^{\prime}-i\right\|=$ |
| i += 1 | 1100 | 1010 | 1000 | 1 | 1111 | $8 \leq \mathrm{i} \leq 15 \wedge\left\|i^{\prime}-\mathrm{i}\right\|=1$ |
| i +=1 | 1101 | 1010 | 1000 | 1 | 1111 | $8 \leq i \leq 15 \wedge\left\|i^{\prime}-\mathrm{i}\right\|=1$ |
| i += 2 | IIII | 1010 | 1000 | 1 | 1101 | $8 \leq i \leq 15 \wedge\left\|i^{\prime}-i\right\| \leq$ |

During checking, clearing an M-bit is an anomaly

## Diduce vs. Daikon

- Less space and time requirements
- Invariants are computed on the fly
- Smaller set of invariants
- Less precise invariants


## Techniques



## Detecting Anomalies



Differences correlate with failure

## Liblit's Sampling

- We want properties of runs in the field
- Collecting all this data is too expensive
- Would a sample suffice?
- Sampling experiment by Liblit et al. (2003)


## Return Values

- Hypothesis: function return values correlate with failure or success
- Classified into positive / zero / negative


## CCRYPT fails

- CCRYPT is an interactive encryption tool
- When CCRYPT asks user for information before overwriting a file, and user responds with EOF, CCRYPT crashes
- 3,000 random runs
- Of I, I70 predicates, only file_exists() >0 and xreadline() $==0$ correlate with failure


## Liblit's Sampling



Properties

- Can we apply this technique to remote runs, too?
- I out of IO00 return values was sampled
- Performance loss <4\%



## Web Services

- Sampling is first choice for web services
- Have I out of 100 users run an instrumented version of the web service
- Correlate instrumentation data with failure
- After sufficient number of runs, we can automatically identify the anomaly


## Techniques

| Dynamic <br> Invariants | Value <br> Ranges | Sampled <br> Values |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

## Anomalies and Causes

- An anomaly is not a cause, but a correlation
- Although correlation $\neq$ causation, anomalies can be excellent hints
- Future belongs to those who exploit
- Correlations in multiple runs
- Causation in experiments


## Locating Defects

$\begin{array}{lll}\text { - NN (Renieris + Reiss, ASE 2003) } & \text { ○ } \text { CT (Cleve + Zeller, ICSE 2005) } \\ \text { - SD (Liblit et al., PLDI 2005) } & \text { o } \operatorname{SOBER~(Liu~et~al,~ESEC~2005)~}\end{array}$


NN (Nearest Neighbor) @Brown by Manos Renieris + Stephen Reiss
CT (Cause Transitions) @Saarland by Holger Cleve + Andreas Zeller SD (Statistical Debugging) @Berkeley by Ben Liblit (now Wisconsin), Mayur Naik (Stanford), Alice Zheng, Alex Aiken (now Stanford), Michael Jordan SOBER @Urbana-

## Concepts

$\star$ Comparing coverage (or other features) shows anomalies correlated with failure
$\star$ Nearest neighbor or sequences locate errors more precisely than just coverage
$\star$ Low overhead + simple to realize

## Concepts (2)

$\star$ Comparing data abstractions shows anomalies correlated with failure

* Variety of abstractions and implementations
$\star$ Anomalies can be excellent hints
* Future: Integration of anomalies + causes

