



# **Tracing Infections**


- For every infection, we must find the earlier infection that causes it.
- Which origin should we focus upon?





## **Focusing on Anomalies**

• Examine origins and locations where something *abnormal* happens



### What's normal?


- General idea: Use induction reasoning from the particular to the general
- Start with a *multitude* of runs
- Determine *properties* that are common across all runs

5

4

#### What's abnormal?

- Suppose we determine common properties of all *passing* runs.
- Now we examine a run which *fails* the test.
- Any difference in properties correlates with failure – and is likely to hint at failure causes



#### **Properties**

Data properties that hold in all runs:

- "At f(), x is odd"
- " $0 \le x \le 10$  during the run"

Code properties that hold in all runs:

- "f() is always executed"
- "After open(), we eventually have close()"

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# **Comparing Coverage**

- 1. Every failure is caused by an infection, which in turn is caused by a defect
- 2. The defect must be *executed* to start the infection
- 3. Code that is executed in failing runs only is thus likely to cause the defect

### The middle program

\$ middle 3 3 5
middle: 3

\$ middle 2 1 3
middle: 1

10

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```
int main(int arc, char *argv[])
{
    int x = atoi(argv[1]);
    int y = atoi(argv[2]);
    int z = atoi(argv[3]);
    int m = middle(x, y, z);
    printf("middle: %d\n", m);
    return 0;
}
```

```
int middle(int x, int y, int z) {
    int m = z;
    if (y < z) {
        if (x < y)
            m = y;
        else if (x < z)
            m = y;
    } else {
        if (x > y)
            m = y;
        else if (x > z)
            m = y;
        else if (x > z)
            m = x;
    }
    return m;
}
```

# **Obtaining Coverage**

for C programs

0 0		Pippin: cgi_encode — less — 80×24
4:	18:	int ok = 0;
-:	10.	$\operatorname{tric}\operatorname{ok}=0,$
38:	20:	while (Mental) (# lean to end of stains (1)01 sharester) #/
-:	20: 21:	<pre>while (*eptr) /* loop to end of string ('\0' character) */ {</pre>
	22:	i char c:
30:	23:	c = *eptr;
30:	Z4:	if (c == '+') { /* '+' maps to blank */
1:	25:	*dptr = ' ':
29:	26:	} else if (c == '%') { /* '%xx' is hex for char xx */
3:	27:	<pre>int digit_high = Hex_Values[*(++eptr)];</pre>
3:	28:	<pre>int digit_low = Hex_Values[*(++eptr)];</pre>
5:	29:	if (digit_high == -1    digit_low == -1)
2:	30:	ok = 1; /* Bad return code */
-:	31:	else
1:	32:	<pre>*dptr = 16 * digit_high + digit_low;</pre>
-:	33:	} else { /* All other characters map to themselves */
26:	34:	<pre>*dptr = *eptr;</pre>
-:	35:	}
30:	36:	++dptr; ++eptr;
-:	37:	}
4:	38:	*dptr = '\0'; /* Null terminator for string */
4:	39:	return ok;
-:	40:}	
(END)		



x	3	1	3	5	5	2
у	3	2	2	5	3	
Z	5	3		5	4	3
<pre>int middle(int x, int y, int z) {</pre>	•	•	•	•	•	•
int m = z;	•	•	•	•	•	•
if (y < z) {	•	•	•	•	•	•
if (x < y)		•				
m = y;		•				
else if (x < z)	•				•	•
m = y;	•					•
} else {	•		•	•		
if $(x > y)$			•			
m = y;			•			
else if (x > z)						
m = x;		in the second	in en de			
}						
return m;	•	•	•	•	•	•
}	~	V	V	<b>v</b>	<b>v</b>	


#### 14


#### **Discrete Coloring**


executed only in failing runs highly suspect


executed in passing and failing runs *ambiguous* 


executed only in passing runs likely correct

















# Evaluation How well does comparing coverage detect anomalies? • How green are the defects? (false negatives) • How red are non-defects? (false positives)


23

#### Space


- 8000 lines of executable code
- 1000 test suites with 156–4700 test cases
- 20 defective versions with one defect each (corrected in subsequent version)








# Siemens Suite 7 C programs, 170–560 lines 132 variations with one defect each 108 all yellow (i.e., useless) I with one red statement (at the defect)









# Sequences of locations can correlate with failures:<

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# **The AspectJ Compiler**

\$ ajc Test3.aj
\$ java test.Test3

\$

test.Test3@b8df17.x Unexpected Signal : 11
occurred at PC=0xFA415A00
Function name=(N/A) Library=(N/A) ...
Please report this error at <u>http://</u>
java.sun.com/...

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#### **Coverage Differences**

- Compare the failing run with passing runs
- BcelShadow.getThisJoinPointVar() is invoked in the failing run only
- Unfortunately, this method is correct


# **Sequence Differences**

This sequence occurs only in the failing run:


ThisJoinPointVisitor.isRef(), ThisJoinPointVisitor.canTreatAsStatic(), MethodDeclaration.traverse(), ThisJoinPointVisitor.isRef(), ThisJoinPointVisitor.isRef()


**Defect** location


34





# Ingoing vs. Outgoing
















Techniques					
Dynamic	Value	Sampled			
Invariants	Ranges	Values			







# Daikon

- Determines invariants from program runs
- Written by Michael Ernst et al. (1998–)
- C++, Java, Lisp, and other languages
- analyzed up to 13,000 lines of code









## **Method Specifications**

using primitive data

x = 6	$x \in \{2, 5, -30\}$	x < y
y = 5x + 10	z = 4x + 12y + 3	z = fn(x, y)

using composite data

A subseq B


checked at method entry + exit


 $x \in A$ 

sorted(A)


50


# Object Invariantsstring.content[string.length] = '\0'node.left.value ≤ node.right.valuethis.next.last = thischecked at entry + exit of public methods






# **Matching Invariants**






# **Matching Invariants**



### Matching Invariants



# **Enhancing Relevance**


- Handle polymorphic variables
- Check for derived values
- Eliminate redundant invariants
- Set statistical threshold for relevance
- Verify correctness with static analysis


polymorphic variables: treat "object x" like "int x" if possible derived values: have "size (...)" as extra value to compare against redundant invariants: like x > 0 => x >= 0statistical threshold: to eliminate random occurrences verify correctness: to make sure invariants **always** hold


#### **Daikon Discussed**


- As long as some property can be observed, it can be added as a pattern
- Pattern vocabulary determines the invariants that can be found ("sum()", etc.)
- Checking all patterns (and combinations!) is expensive
- Trivial invariants must be eliminated

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# **Training Mode**



- Start with empty set of invariants
- Adjust invariants according to values found during run

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# **Invariants in Diduce**

For each variable, Diduce has a pair (V, M)

- V = initial value of variable
- M = range of values: i-th bit of M is cleared if value change in i-th bit was observed
- With each assignment of a new value W,
   M is updated to M := M ∧ ¬ (W ⊗ V)
- Differences are stored in same format

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# **Training Example**


Code	i	Val	ues	Differ	ences	Invariant
		V	М	V	М	
i = 10	1010	1010	1111	-	-	i = 10
i += 1	1011	1010	1110		Ш	$10 \le i \le 1   \land  i' - i  =$
i += 1	1100	1010	1000	I	1111	$8 \leq i \leq 15 \land  i' - i  = 1$
i += 1	1101	1010	1000	I	1111	$8 \leq i \leq 15 \land  i' - i  = 1$
i += 2	1111	1010	1000	I	1101	$8 \leq i \leq 15 \land  i'-i  \leq$

During checking, clearing an M-bit is an anomaly

# Diduce vs. Daikon

- Less space and time requirements
- Invariants are computed on the fly
- Smaller set of invariants
- Less precise invariants

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# **Detecting Anomalies**



# Liblit's Sampling

- We want properties of runs in the field
- Collecting all this data is too expensive
- Would a sample suffice?
- Sampling experiment by Liblit et al. (2003)

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#### **Return Values**

- Hypothesis: *function return values* correlate with failure or success
- Classified into positive / zero / negative

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#### **CCRYPT** fails

- CCRYPT is an interactive encryption tool
- When CCRYPT asks user for information before overwriting a file, and user responds with EOF, CCRYPT crashes
- 3,000 random runs
- Of I,I70 predicates, only file\_exists() > 0 and xreadline() == 0 correlate with failure


# Liblit's Sampling



**Properties** 


- Can we apply this technique to remote runs, too?
- I out of 1000 return values was sampled
- Performance loss <4%

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
#### **Web Services**

- Sampling is first choice for web services
- Have I out of 100 users run an instrumented version of the web service
- Correlate instrumentation data with failure
- After sufficient number of runs, we can automatically identify the anomaly



### **Anomalies and Causes**

- An anomaly is not a cause, but a correlation
- Although correlation ≠ causation, anomalies can be excellent hints
- Future belongs to those who exploit
  - Correlations in *multiple runs*
  - Causation in experiments



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NN (Nearest Neighbor) @Brown by Manos Renieris + Stephen Reiss CT (Cause Transitions) @Saarland by Holger Cleve + Andreas Zeller SD (Statistical Debugging) @Berkeley by Ben Liblit (now Wisconsin), Mayur Naik (Stanford), Alice Zheng, Alex Aiken (now Stanford), Michael Jordan SOBER @Urbana-78 Champaign + Purdue by

#### Concepts

- Comparing coverage (or other features) shows anomalies correlated with failure
- ★ Nearest neighbor or sequences locate errors more precisely than just coverage
- $\star$  Low overhead + simple to realize

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#### **Concepts (2)**

- ★ Comparing data abstractions shows anomalies correlated with failure
- $\star$  Variety of abstractions and implementations
- $\star$  Anomalies can be excellent hints
- ★ Future: Integration of anomalies + causes

